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The Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., Senior United States District Judge*
for the Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
NOT-PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 06-5025
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
       v.
JEFFREY  EDWARD CANCILLA,
                                                Appellant
              
_____________________
On Appeal from the District Court for the
 Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 05-CR-058
District Judge: The Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
 _____________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 20, 2008
Before: SMITH, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges,
and STAFFORD, District Judge*





   21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) provides in pertinent part: “Any person who1
knowingly or intentionally . . . possesses or distributes a listed chemical knowing,
or having reasonable cause to believe, that the listed chemical will be used to
manufacture a controlled substance except as authorized by this subchapter . . . .”
Id.
2
Jeffrey Edward Cancilla (hereinafter “Cancilla”) appeals his conviction of
possessing pseudoephedrine to manufacture methamphetamine on or about
October 14, 2005 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).   Cancilla filed a motion to1
suppress evidence stemming from a search of his vehicle, arguing that there were
insufficient facts stated in the affidavit to support the application of the search
warrant.  The Government argued that the search warrant affidavit did contain
sufficient information to establish probable cause, and alternatively that even if
probable cause was lacking, the fruits of the search fell within the good faith
exception as articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984).We
conclude that, although a close question, probable cause was present.  We will
affirm the District Court. 
On October 14, 2005, store security at a Giant Eagle supermarket in Erie,
Pennsylvania detained Cancilla after observing him place six boxes of cold
medicine, containing pseudoephedrine, in his coat.  At some point during his
detention, Cancilla ingested a half-ounce of crystal methamphetamine.  Cancilla
3was immediately taken to a nearby hospital, where he was treated for
approximately four days.  While at the hospital, Pennsylvania State Trooper
Robert Youngberg filed a criminal complaint and secured an arrest warrant for
Cancilla.  Officers arrested Cancilla, gave him his Miranda warnings, and
subsequently interviewed him.  During the interview, Cancilla described himself
as the “Pill Man” because he regularly stole pills containing pseudoephedrine in
order to manufacture and sell illegal methamphetamine.  He also admitted that he
drove his truck to the Giant Eagle in order to procure the pills.  
After the interview, Trooper William McClellan applied for and obtained a
search warrant to search Cancilla’s truck, a 1991 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer.  The
affidavit cited the facts relating to Cancilla’s arrest, hospitalization and interview.
In support of the search warrant, the affidavit explained that “[t]he probable cause
. . . is based on the afiants [sic] personal participation in this investigation as well
as information provided by the owner of the property to be searched . . . .” 
(App’x. at 34.)  The affidavit also stated, in the last line, that Cancilla “drove his
vehicle, truck, to the Giant Eagle.” (Id.)
The search of the truck on October 18, 2005 led to the seizure of a variety of
items that are used in the production of methamphetamines, including over 1300
pseudoephedrine pills, eight lithium batteries, and a digital pocket scale.  In his
  The plea agreement stipulated that a direct appeal from his conviction2
would be limited to whether the suppression motion was properly denied. 
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we3
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4
May 25, 2006 Motion to Suppress, Cancilla argued that the affidavit did not
specify the vehicle that he drove to the Giant Eagle and that there was insufficient
probable cause to search the truck.  On August 23, 2006, the District Court denied
Cancilla’s Motion to Suppress finding that a common sense reading of the warrant
supported a reasonable inference of probable cause to search the vehicle. 
Immediately following the suppression hearing, Cancilla entered a conditional
plea of guilty.   On November 29, 2006, Cancilla was sentenced to 151 months of2
incarceration followed by three years of supervised release.   This timely appeal
followed.  3
We exercise plenary review of a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress.  United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 265 (3d Cir. 1999).  We apply a
deferential standard of review as to both the magistrate’s determination that
probable cause existed and the magistrate’s authorization of the search.  Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236-38 (1983).  The Supreme Court has instructed that an
issuing authority should “make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . . there is a fair
  As to the Government’s alternative argument before the District Court,4
even where the magistrate judge has not had a sufficient basis for a probable cause
determination, that fact alone does not warrant the “extreme sanction of
exclusion.”  U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).  A good faith exception exists
where the suppression of evidence would be inappropriate because an officer acts
in “objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant’s authority.”  United States v.
Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2002).  We exercise plenary review over a
District Court’s determination that the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applies.  United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2001).
5
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.”  Id. at 238.  The reviewing court, however, is to “simply . . . ensure that the
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.”  Id.
at 238-39 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  4
Cancilla contends that there was not a sufficient nexus between his activity
in the Giant Eagle and the vehicle in the parking lot.  He also counters that the
warrant was insufficient to support a finding that the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule should apply.  We disagree.
A search warrant does not have to identify direct evidence linking a
defendant to a particular location. United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 307 (3d
Cir. 2001).  “Probable cause can be, and often is, inferred by considering the type
of crime, [and] the nature of the items sought . . . . A court is entitled to draw
reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the
nature of the evidence and the type of offense.”  Id. (internal quotations and
  Judge Smith is dubitante on the existence of probable cause.  He5
concludes, nonetheless, that the search falls within Leon’s good faith exception. 
468 U.S. at 926. 
6
citations omitted).  We are persuaded that there was sufficient probable cause to
search Cancilla’s truck.  Cancilla had admitted to the troopers that he regularly
engaged in stealing or buying pseudoephedrine pills and that he was considered
the “Pill Man.”  Given this admission about a course of conduct, the fact that
Cancilla used the truck to transport himself to the scene of the crime, and that he
presumably intended to use it to depart the crime scene, it was reasonable for the
troopers to believe that the truck would contain contraband.
Yet even if we were to determine that probable cause to search did not exist
here, we conclude that the good faith exception is applicable.   Although the5
District Court did not reach the issue of the good faith exception’s application, the
Government did raise the issue in response to the defendant’s motion to suppress. 
(App’x at 41.)  We are, therefore, free to reach the issue at this time.  The test used
to determine whether the good faith exception applies is “whether a reasonably
well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the
magistrate’s authorization.” Hodge, 246 F.3d at 307 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).   Although the existence of a warrant is ordinarily sufficient to
demonstrate an officer conducted a search in good faith, this Court has
7nevertheless identified four situations where an officer’s reliance on a warrant
would be objectively unreasonable: (1) where the magistrate issues a warrant in
reliance on an affidavit that is deliberately or recklessly false; (2) where a
magistrate abandons his judicial role and fails to execute the warrant in a neutral
and detached manner; (3) where the warrant is “so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; or (4)
where the warrant is so facially deficient that it does not particularize with any
specificity the place to be searched or the things to be seized.  Id. at 308 (internal
citations omitted).  We conclude that Cancilla has failed to demonstrate that any of
the exceptions are applicable here.
We agree with the District Court that the totality of the circumstances are
sufficient, if barely, to support the existence of probable cause.  Alternatively, in
the absence of probable cause, we would conclude that the good faith exception
renders the search lawful. For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of
the District Court. 
